Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 124, issue C, 2020

Inequality, redistribution and the rise of outsider candidates pp. 1-16

Leyla D. Karakas and Devashish Mitra

A gift with thoughtfulness: A field experiment on work incentives pp. 17-42

Cangjian Cao, Sherry Xin Li and Tracy Xiao Liu

Undiscounted bandit games pp. 43-61

R Keller and Sven Rady

Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities pp. 62-81

Jan Christoph Schlegel and Akaki Mamageishvili

Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-k comparison pp. 82-104

Bernardo García-Pola

Cheap talk with coarse understanding pp. 105-121

Jeanne Hagenbach and Frederic Koessler

Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs pp. 122-139

Jérôme Renault and Bruno Ziliotto

On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets pp. 140-168

Yehuda Levy and Andre Veiga

Equivalence of canonical matching models pp. 169-182

John Kennes, Daniel le Maire and Sebastian T. Roelsgaard

Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty pp. 183-206

Artyom Shneyerov and Adam C.L. Wong

Backward induction in games without perfect recall pp. 207-218

John Hillas and Dmitriy Kvasov

On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness pp. 219-238

Agustín Bonifacio and Jordi Masso

Pathways of persuasion pp. 239-253

Lucas Coffman and Paul Niehaus

The timing of discretionary bonuses – effort, signals, and reciprocity pp. 254-280

Luke Boosey and Sebastian Goerg

Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets pp. 281-287

Rachel C. Shafer

Social norms with private values: Theory and experiments pp. 288-304

Giovanna d'Adda, Martin Dufwenberg, Francesco Passarelli and Guido Tabellini

The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences pp. 305-318

Gaoji Hu, Jiangtao Li and Rui Tang

Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network pp. 319-353

Romain Ferrali

Can intermediaries assure contracts? Experimental evidence pp. 354-368

Michael Mitzkewitz and Tibor Neugebauer

When consumers do not make an active decision: Dynamic default rules and their equilibrium effects pp. 369-385

Keith Ericson

Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer pp. 386-405

Juan Carlos Carbajal and Ahuva Mu'alem

Networks, frictions, and price dispersion pp. 406-431

Javier Donna, Pablo Schenone and Gregory Veramendi

Regular potential games pp. 432-453

Brian Swenson, Ryan Murray and Soummya Kar

Peaches, lemons, and cookies: Designing auction markets with dispersed information pp. 454-477

Ittai Abraham, Susan Athey, Moshe Babaioff and Michael D. Grubb

The capacity constrained facility location problem pp. 478-490

Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Barton Lee and David C. Parkes

Too good to fire: Non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game pp. 491-511

Benjamin Sperisen and Thomas Wiseman

A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation pp. 512-533

Andrew Mackenzie

Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games pp. 534-553

Michal Szkup and Isabel Trevino

The rationale of in-group favoritism: An experimental test of three explanations pp. 554-568

Giuseppe Ciccarone, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo and Stefano Papa

Does poverty negate the impact of social norms on cheating? pp. 569-578

Suparee Boonmanunt, Agne Kajackaite and Stephan Meier

Entering classes in the college admissions model pp. 579-587

Qingyun Wu

Never underestimate your opponent: Hindsight bias causes overplacement and overentry into competition pp. 588-603

David Danz

Framing and repeated competition pp. 604-619

Aidas Masiliūnas and Heinrich H. Nax

Endogenous quantal response equilibrium pp. 620-643

Evan Friedman

Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers pp. 644-658

Mukund Sundararajan and Qiqi Yan

An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium pp. 659-670

Yin Chen and Chuangyin Dang

Volume 123, issue C, 2020

Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: Evidence from China's college admissions pp. 1-21

Binzhen Wu and Xiaohan Zhong

Theories and cases in decisions under uncertainty pp. 22-40

Itzhak Gilboa, Stefania Minardi and Larry Samuelson

Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms pp. 41-53

Jan Christoph Schlegel

Bayesian games with intentions pp. 54-67

Adam Bjorndahl, Joseph Halpern and Rafael Pass

Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching pp. 68-80

Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli and Jonathan Newton

Social learning with coordination motives pp. 81-100

Yangbo Song and Jiahua Zhang

Corrupt police pp. 101-119

Klaus Abbink, Dmitry Ryvkin and Danila Serra

Rationalizable choice functions pp. 120-126

Yi-You Yang

Feedback spillovers across tasks, self-confidence and competitiveness pp. 127-170

Ritwik Banerjee, Nabanita Datta Gupta and Marie Claire Villeval

Group identification: An integrated approach pp. 171-181

Wonki Cho and Biung-Ghi Ju

Fictitious play in networks pp. 182-206

Christian Ewerhart and Kremena Valkanova

Peers or police?: The effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods pp. 210-227

Gregory DeAngelo and Laura Gee

Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game pp. 228-239

Tomoya Tajika

Reputation and news suppression in the media industry pp. 240-271

Ascension Andina-Diaz and José A. García-Martínez

Social and strategic ambiguity versus betrayal aversion pp. 272-287

Chen Li, Uyanga Turmunkh and Peter Wakker

Equilibrium existence in games with a concave Bayesian potential pp. 288-294

Ezra Einy and Ori Haimanko

Tatonnement beyond gross substitutes? Gradient descent to the rescue pp. 295-326

Yun Kuen Cheung, Richard Cole and Nikhil R. Devanur

Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient pp. 327-341

Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin and Brendan Lucier

Clinching auctions with online supply pp. 342-358

Gagan Goel, Vahab Mirrokni and Renato Paes Leme

The price of stability for undirected broadcast network design with fair cost allocation is constant pp. 359-376

Vittorio Bilò, Michele Flammini and Luca Moscardelli