Position auctions with multi-unit demands

Haomin Yan

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 127, issue C, 179-193

Abstract: This paper studies the design of position auctions when bidders have multi-unit demands for advertising positions. I propose an ascending clock auction with two stages: allocation stage and assignment stage. The allocation stage determines the quantity of positions assigned to each advertiser using a generalized version of the Ausubel (2004) auction under the context of differentiated items. The assignment stage determines the ranking of advertisements using a generalized version of the generalized English auction under the context of multi-unit demands. I show that this two-stage ascending clock auction dynamically implements the VCG outcome in an ex post perfect equilibrium under pure private values.

Keywords: Position auctions; Multi-unit demands; Ascending clock auctions; VCG (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:127:y:2021:i:c:p:179-193

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.002

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