Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 63, issue 2, 2008

Presidential address pp. 421-430

Ehud Kalai

2004 World Congress Special Issue pp. 431-434

Philip Reny

Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate pp. 435-467

Mark Satterthwaite and Artyom Shneyerov

Efficient communication in the electronic mail game pp. 468-497

Kris De Jaegher

When is reputation bad? pp. 498-526

Jeffrey Ely, Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Ex post implementation pp. 527-566

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness pp. 567-587

Herve Moulin

Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles pp. 588-620

Moshe Babaioff and Liad Blumrosen

New complexity results about Nash equilibria pp. 621-641

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm

Simple search methods for finding a Nash equilibrium pp. 642-662

Ryan Porter, Eugene Nudelman and Yoav Shoham

Sequential decisions with tests pp. 663-678

David Gill and Daniel Sgroi

The value of a stochastic information structure pp. 679-693

Yaron Azrieli and Ehud Lehrer

Volume 63, issue 1, 2008

24. Pricing in Bertrand competition with increasing marginal costs pp. 1-31

Klaus Abbink and Jordi Brandts

Proper scoring rules for general decision models pp. 32-40

Christopher Chambers

Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies pp. 41-55

Tarek Coury and Vladimir Petkov

Does monitoring decrease work effort?: The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories pp. 56-76

David Dickinson and Marie Claire Villeval

Asymmetric evolutionary games with non-linear pure strategy payoffs pp. 77-90

Michael A. Fishman

License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers pp. 91-106

Thomas Giebe and Elmar Wolfstetter

Case-based learning with different similarity functions pp. 107-132

Ani Guerdjikova

A non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules of bankruptcy problems pp. 133-144

Chih Chang and Cheng-Cheng Hu

Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions pp. 145-165

Rene Kirkegaard and Per Overgaard

Adaptation and complexity in repeated games pp. 166-187

Eliot Maenner

Group identification pp. 188-202

Alan Miller

Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system pp. 203-226

Christina Pawlowitsch

Regret minimization in repeated matrix games with variable stage duration pp. 227-258

Shie Mannor and Nahum Shimkin

Fictitious play in 3x3 games: The transition between periodic and chaotic behaviour pp. 259-291

Colin Sparrow, Sebastian van Strien and Christopher Harris

Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees pp. 292-307

Dale Stahl and Ernan Haruvy

Coordination cycles pp. 308-327

Jakub Steiner

The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses pp. 328-340

Satoru Takahashi

Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index pp. 341-353

Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano

Long-run selection and the work ethic pp. 354-365

Jens Josephson and Karl Wärneryd

Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample pp. 366-369

Philipp Wichardt

Evaluating generalizability and parameter consistency in learning models pp. 370-394

Eldad Yechiam and Jerome R. Busemeyer

Epistemic conditions for rationalizability pp. 395-405

Eduardo Zambrano

Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals pp. 406-416

Bingyong Zheng

H. Peyton Young, Strategic Learning and Its Limits, Oxford Univ. Press (2004) 165 pages pp. 417-420

William Sandholm

Volume 62, issue 2, 2008

Multiperson utility pp. 329-347

Manel Baucells and Lloyd Shapley

Consistent representative democracy pp. 348-363

Christopher Chambers

Playing the wrong game: An experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation pp. 364-382

Giovanna Devetag and Massimo Warglien

Creating competition out of thin air: An experimental study of right-to-choose auctions pp. 383-416

Kfir Eliaz, Theo Offerman and Andrew Schotter

Bargaining, search, and outside options pp. 417-435

Anita Gantner

Information acquisition in committees pp. 436-459

Dino Gerardi and Leeat Yariv

Stable governments and the semistrict core pp. 460-475

Dinko Dimitrov and Claus-Jochen Haake

Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders pp. 476-508

Ronald Harstad, Aleksandar Sasa Pekec and Ilia Tsetlin

When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation pp. 509-532

Daniel Houser, Erte Xiao, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith

Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations pp. 533-557

Philippe Jehiel and Frederic Koessler

Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case pp. 558-572

Justin Leroux

Diffusion in complex social networks pp. 573-590

Dunia López-Pintado

Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions pp. 591-609

Claudio Mezzetti, Aleksandar Sasa Pekec and Ilia Tsetlin

Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces pp. 610-627

Thomas Norman

Lexicographic composition of simple games pp. 628-642

Barry O'Neill and Bezalel Peleg

A game of timing and visibility pp. 643-660

Zvi Lotker, Boaz Patt-Shamir and Mark R. Tuttle

A Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit pp. 661-674

Abhijit Sengupta and Kunal Sengupta

Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individuals versus group-representatives pp. 675-696

Fei Song

Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis pp. 697-721

John Kagel, Svetlana Pevnitskaya and Lixin Ye

Consensus and common knowledge of an aggregate of decisions pp. 722-731

Lucie Ménager

Comparison of information structures in zero-sum games pp. 732-735

Marcin Peski

Statement of precedence and a comment on IIA terminology pp. 736-738

Bernard Monjardet

Volume 62, issue 1, 2008

The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions pp. 1-25

Estelle Cantillon

Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms pp. 26-52

Herbert Dawid and W. Bentley Macleod

Universal knowledge-belief structures pp. 53-66

Martin Meier

An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma pp. 67-76

David Myatt and Chris Wallace

The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games pp. 77-92

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Gerard van der Laan and Adolphus Talman

The two-person beauty contest pp. 93-99

Brit Grosskopf and Rosemarie Nagel

Cores of convex and strictly convex games pp. 100-105

Julio González-Díaz and Estela Sanchez-Rodriguez

Ambiguity aversion, games against nature, and dynamic consistency pp. 106-115

Emre Ozdenoren and James Peck

Core stability in chain-component additive games pp. 116-139

Bas van Velzen, Herbert Hamers and Tamás Solymosi

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint pp. 140-154

Helmuts Azacis

Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty pp. 155-179

Theodore Turocy

Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games pp. 180-189

Miltiadis Makris

Reputation and impermanent types pp. 190-210

Thomas Wiseman

Prudence in bargaining: The effect of uncertainty on bargaining outcomes pp. 211-231

Lucy White

Interactive unawareness revisited pp. 232-262

Joseph Halpern and Leandro Chaves Rego

The tree of experience in the forest of information: Overweighing experienced relative to observed information pp. 263-286

Uri Simonsohn, Niklas Karlsson, George Loewenstein and Dan Ariely

Testing theories of fairness--Intentions matter pp. 287-303

Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher

A canonical model for interactive unawareness pp. 304-324

Aviad Heifetz, Martin Meier and Burkhard Schipper

Erratum to "Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions" [Games Econ. Behav. 61 (2007) 179-197] pp. 324-325

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Simon Weidenholzer

Expanded number of Editors at Games and Economic Behavior pp. 324-326

Ehud Kalai