The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games

Ratul Lahkar () and William Sandholm

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 64, issue 2, 565-590

Abstract: The projection dynamic is an evolutionary dynamic for population games. It is derived from a model of individual choice in which agents abandon their current strategies at rates inversely proportional to the strategies' current levels of use. The dynamic admits a simple geometric definition, its rest points coincide with the Nash equilibria of the underlying game, and it converges globally to Nash equilibrium in potential games and in stable games.

Date: 2008
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