Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
Jordi Masso and
Antonio Nicolo' ()
Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 64, issue 2, 591-611
We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.
Keywords: Public; goods; Gregarious; preferences; Subgame; perfect; implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:591-611
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