Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences
Jordi Masso and
Antonio Nicolo' ()
UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.
Keywords: Public Goods; Gregarious Preferences; Subgame Perfect Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D71 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:714.07
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