Convergence of strategic behavior to price taking

Leonidas C. Koutsougeras

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 65, issue 1, 234-241

Abstract: We address the following issue: what can be said about the degree of competition, in a set of markets with a large number of participants, when no information on the distribution of individual characteristics is available? Our main result is that the proportion of individuals whose strategic behavior differs substantially from price taking, converges to zero as the number of market participants becomes large, regardless of the distribution of characteristics.

Keywords: Strategic; behavior; Price; taking; Convergence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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