Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: Experimental evidence pp. 209-230: Alessandra Cassar
Counting combinatorial choice rules pp. 231-245: Federico Echenique
Money illusion and coordination failure pp. 246-268: Ernst Fehr and Jean-Robert Tyran
Naive learning and cooperation in network experiments pp. 269-292: Oliver Kirchkamp and Rosemarie Nagel
The evolution of cooperation through imitation pp. 293-315: David Levine and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Large newsvendor games pp. 316-337: Luigi Montrucchio and Marco Scarsini
Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly pp. 338-353: Sudesh Mujumdar and Debashis Pal
Fair allocation in networks with externalities pp. 354-364: Noemí Navarro
Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games: An experimental approach pp. 365-393: Andrew Schotter and Barry Sopher
Commuters route choice behaviour pp. 394-406: Reinhard Selten, Thorsten Chmura, T. Pitz, Sebastian Kube and M. Schreckenberg

Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates pp. 1-29: Dan Bernhardt, John Duggan and Francesco Squintani
Anti-coordination and social interactions pp. 30-49: Yann Bramoullé
Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions: An experimental study pp. 50-74: Jeannette Brosig-Koch and Rei[ss], J. Philipp
Hard evidence and mechanism design pp. 75-93: Jesse Bull and Joel Watson
Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information pp. 94-120: Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum
Market design with endogenous preferences pp. 121-153: Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev and Eric Talley
Paths to stability for matching markets with couples pp. 154-171: Bettina Klaus and Flip Klijn
Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome pp. 172-180: Hannu Vartiainen
Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions pp. 181-207: Lixin Ye

Information revelation in auctions pp. 181-205: Jean-Pierre Benoit and Juan Dubra
Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work? pp. 206-235: Timothy Cason, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Tomas Sjostrom and Takehiko Yamato
Benchmarking real-valued acts pp. 236-253: Erio Castagnoli and Marco LiCalzi
Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers pp. 254-263: Juan Gomez
Averting economic collapse and the solipsism bias pp. 264-285: Antonio Guarino, Steffen Huck and Thomas Jeitschko
Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium pp. 286-303: Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
Efficient bidding with externalities pp. 304-320: Ines Macho-Stadler, David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein
Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium pp. 321-346: Igal Milchtaich
Behavioral conformity in games with many players pp. 347-360: Myrna Wooders, Edward Cartwright and Reinhard Selten
Correlated quantal responses and equilibrium selection pp. 361-369: Takashi Ui

Configuration values: Extensions of the coalitional Owen value pp. 1-17: M.J. Albizuri, J. Aurrecoechea and José Zarzuelo
Credible implementation pp. 18-36: Bhaskar Chakravorty, Luis Corchon and Simon Wilkie
Noisy leadership: An experimental approach pp. 37-62: Werner Guth, Wieland Müller and Yossi Spiegel
Cost allocation schemes: An asymptotic approach pp. 63-72: Mª Concepción Larrea and Juan Carlos Santos
Universal possibility and impossibility results pp. 73-85: Urs Schweizer
Alternative characterizations of three bargaining solutions for nonconvex problems pp. 86-92: Yongsheng Xu and Naoki Yoshihara
An initial implementation of the Turing tournament to learning in repeated two-person games pp. 93-122: Jasmina Arifovic, Richard D. McKelvey and Svetlana Pevnitskaya
An experimental study of storable votes pp. 123-154: Alessandra Casella, Andrew Gelman and Thomas Palfrey
A theory of voting in large elections pp. 155-180: Richard D. McKelvey and John W. Patty

A contract-based model for directed network formation pp. 201-224: Ramesh Johari, Shie Mannor and John N. Tsitsiklis
Auction and the informed seller problem pp. 225-258: Bruno Jullien and Thomas Mariotti
Individual or team decision-making--Causes and consequences of self-selection pp. 259-270: Martin Kocher, Strau[ss], Sabine and Matthias Sutter
Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations pp. 271-284: Justin Lenzo and Todd Sarver
Generalised weakened fictitious play pp. 285-298: David S. Leslie and E.J. Collins
Rationalizable foresight dynamics pp. 299-322: Akihiko Matsui and Daisuke Oyama
Capacity precommitment and price competition yield the Cournot outcome pp. 323-332: Diego Moreno and Luis Ubeda
Volunteering for heterogeneous tasks pp. 333-349: Nicolas Sahuguet
Multiple equilibrium overnight rates in a dynamic interbank market game pp. 350-370: Jens Tapking
p-Best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information pp. 371-384: Olivier Tercieux

Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics pp. 1-6: Ulrich Berger and Josef Hofbauer
Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games pp. 7-36: Hongbin Cai and Joseph Wang
Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints pp. 37-44: Gorkem Celik
Small- and large-stakes risk aversion: Implications of concavity calibration for decision theory pp. 45-60: James Cox and Vjollca Sadiraj
Indifference or indecisiveness? Choice-theoretic foundations of incomplete preferences pp. 61-86: Kfir Eliaz and Efe Ok
Can anticipatory feelings explain anomalous choices of information sources? pp. 87-104: Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler
The positive foundation of the common prior assumption pp. 105-120: Aviad Heifetz
Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation pp. 121-134: Tamar Kugler, Zvika Neeman and Nir Vulkan
Approachable sets of vector payoffs in stochastic games pp. 135-147: Emanuel Milman
Aggregating disparate estimates of chance pp. 148-173: Daniel Osherson and Moshe Y. Vardi
Sunspots, correlation and competition pp. 174-184: Herakles M. Polemarchakis and Indrajit Ray
Locating public facilities by majority: Stability, consistency and group formation pp. 185-200: Salvador Barberà and Carmen Bevia