Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 90, issue C, 2015

Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals pp. 1-16

Juan Ortner

Decentralized matching and social segregation pp. 17-43

Yan Chen, Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher and Peter Morgan

A passion for voting pp. 44-65

Elena Panova

On bidding with securities: Risk aversion and positive dependence pp. 66-80

Vineet Abhishek, Bruce Hajek and Steven R. Williams

Posted price selling and online auctions pp. 81-92

Sajid Anwar and Mingli Zheng

Learning, hypothesis testing, and rational-expectations equilibrium pp. 93-105

Thomas Norman

Optimal compatibility in systems markets pp. 106-118

Sang-Hyun Kim and Jay Choi

Size versus fairness in the assignment problem pp. 119-127

Anna Bogomolnaia and Herve Moulin

Sequential cheap talks pp. 128-133

Keiichi Kawai

Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule pp. 134-150

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, María Gómez-Rúa and Elena Molis

Bargaining with non-convexities pp. 151-161

P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski

Recall and private monitoring pp. 162-170

Christopher Phelan and Andrzej Skrzypacz

Ambiguous language and common priors pp. 171-180

Joseph Halpern and Willemien Kets

Learning about challengers pp. 181-206

Odilon Câmara and Dan Bernhardt

Committees with leaks pp. 207-214

Saptarshi P. Ghosh and Jaideep Roy

Experimental design to persuade pp. 215-226

Anton Kolotilin

Auctions with online supply pp. 227-246

Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen and Aaron Roth

Stochastic bequest games pp. 247-256

Łukasz Balbus, Anna Jaśkiewicz and Andrzej Nowak

Ex post information rents in sequential screening pp. 257-273

Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz

Volume 89, issue C, 2015

Multi-object auctions with resale: Theory and experiment pp. 1-16

Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Kristian Lopez-Vargas and Erkut Ozbay

Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory pp. 17-33

Eva Hoppe and Patrick Schmitz

Premise-based versus outcome-based information aggregation pp. 34-42

Geoffroy de Clippel and Kfir Eliaz

An extension of quasi-hyperbolic discounting to continuous time pp. 43-55

Jinrui Pan, Craig Webb and Horst Zank

The division problem under constraints pp. 56-77

Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme

The axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes pp. 78-92

Gustavo Bergantiños and Juan Moreno-Ternero

X-games pp. 93-100

Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler

Strategy-proof cost sharing under increasing returns: Improvement of the supremal welfare loss pp. 101-121

Kazuhiko Hashimoto and Hiroki Saitoh

Symmetric zero-sum games with only asymmetric equilibria pp. 122-125

Dimitrios Xefteris

Volume 88, issue C, 2014

Unpredictability of complex (pure) strategies pp. 1-15

Tai-Wei Hu

Justifiable punishments in repeated games pp. 16-28

Miguel Aramendia and Quan Wen

Fair by design: Multidimensional envy-free mechanisms pp. 29-46

Ahuva Mu'alem

Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets pp. 47-70

Alessandra Casella and Sébastien Turban

Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality pp. 71-89

Gilad Bavly and Abraham Neyman

Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets pp. 90-111

Ryoji Sawa

Card games and economic behavior pp. 112-129

Leonardo Becchetti, Maurizio Fiaschetti and Giancarlo Marini

All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes pp. 130-134

Yizhaq Minchuk and Aner Sela

A strategic approach to multiple estate division problems pp. 135-152

Dénes Pálvölgyi, Hans Peters and Dries Vermeulen

A battle of informed traders and the market game foundations for rational expectations equilibrium pp. 153-173

James Peck

Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders pp. 174-189

Attila Ambrus and Shih En Lu

Attributes pp. 190-206

Diego Klabjan, Wojciech Olszewski and Asher Wolinsky

Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable pp. 207-210

John Rehbeck

A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction pp. 221-241

Giacomo Bonanno

Priority matchings revisited pp. 242-249

Yasunori Okumura

“Bucket auctions” for charity pp. 260-276

Jeffrey Carpenter, Jessica Holmes and Peter Matthews

Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem pp. 277-285

Ron Holzman and Dov Samet

Deviations, uncertainty and the core pp. 286-297

R.R. Routledge

Beliefs and actions in the trust game: Creating instrumental variables to estimate the causal effect pp. 298-309

Miguel Costa-Gomes, Steffen Huck and Georg Weizsäcker

Network games under strategic complementarities pp. 310-319

Mohamed Belhaj, Yann Bramoullé and Frédéric Deroïan

Optimal licensing of uncertain patents in the shadow of litigation pp. 320-338

Rabah Amir, David Encaoua and Yassine Lefouili

Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games pp. 339-353

Francis Bloch and Anne van den Nouweland

Preemption games under Lévy uncertainty pp. 354-380

Svetlana Boyarchenko and Sergei Levendorskiĭ