Selling privacy at auction

Arpita Ghosh and Aaron Roth

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 91, issue C, 334-346

Abstract: We study markets for private data using differential privacy. We consider a setting in which a data analyst wishes to buy information from a population from which he can estimate some statistic. The analyst wishes to obtain an accurate estimate cheaply, while the owners of the private data experience some cost for their loss of privacy. Agents are rational and we wish to design truthful mechanisms.

Keywords: Privacy; Mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825613000961
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:334-346

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.013

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().