Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Neuroeconomics: Present and future pp. 201-212: Aldo Rustichini
Physiological utility theory and the neuroeconomics of choice pp. 213-256: Paul W. Glimcher, Michael C. Dorris and Hannah M. Bayer
A brain imaging study of the choice procedure pp. 257-282: Aldo Rustichini, John Dickhaut, Paolo Ghirardato, Kip Smith and Jose V. Pardo
Employing labor-supply theory to measure the reward value of electrical brain stimulation pp. 283-304: Kent L. Conover and Peter Shizgal
Neurally reconstructing expected utility pp. 305-315: Brian Knutson and Richard Peterson
Economics and emotion: Institutions matter pp. 316-335: Kip Smith and John Dickhaut
The somatic marker hypothesis: A neural theory of economic decision pp. 336-372: Antoine Bechara and Antonio R. Damasio
Identifying individual differences: An algorithm with application to Phineas Gage pp. 373-385: Daniel Houser, Antoine Bechara, Michael Keane, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith
Experimental tests of the Somatic Marker hypothesis pp. 386-409: Jonathan Leland and Jordan Grafman
Deconstructing the law of effect pp. 410-423: C.R. Gallistel
Self-referential thinking and equilibrium as states of mind in games: fMRI evidence pp. 424-459: Meghana Bhatt and Colin F. Camerer
Modeling internal commitment mechanisms and self-control: A neuroeconomics approach to consumption-saving decisions pp. 460-492: Jess Benhabib and Alberto Bisin

Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model pp. 1-19: Miguel Aramendia, Mª Concepción Larrea and Luis Ruiz
Bargaining with ordinal and cardinal players pp. 20-33: Emilio Calvo Ramón and Hans Peters
Stability in dynamic matching markets pp. 34-53: Ettore Damiano and Ricky Lam
Subjective reasoning--dynamic games pp. 54-93: Yossi Feinberg
Subjective reasoning--solutions pp. 94-132: Yossi Feinberg
Learning in perturbed asymmetric games pp. 133-152: Josef Hofbauer and Ed Hopkins
House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence pp. 153-185: Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver
Divide-and-permute pp. 186-200: William Thomson

Special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Richard D. McKelvey pp. 237-242: Thomas Palfrey
A dynamic homotopy interpretation of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence pp. 243-263: Theodore Turocy
Asymptotic expected number of Nash equilibria of two-player normal form games pp. 264-295: Andrew McLennan and Johannes Berg
Random belief equilibrium in normal form games pp. 296-323: James Friedman and Claudio Mezzetti
Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game pp. 324-348: Kang-Oh Yi
An experimental study of costly coordination pp. 349-364: Jacob Goeree and Charles Holt
Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory pp. 365-390: Guillaume Frechette, John Kagel and Massimo Morelli
Storable votes pp. 391-419: Alessandra Casella
Strongly stable networks pp. 420-444: Matthew Jackson and Anne van den Nouweland
Sequential voting with abstention pp. 445-463: Marco Battaglini
Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework pp. 464-489: Adam Meirowitz
Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates pp. 490-522: John Duggan and Mark Fey
Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models pp. 523-536: John Wiggs Patty
Counterfactuals in wonderland pp. 537-541: Dov Samet

Cross-owned firms competing in auctions pp. 1-19: Ottorino Chillemi
Compound voting and the Banzhaf index pp. 20-30: Pradeep Dubey, Ezra Einy and Ori Haimanko
Learning, information, and sorting in market entry games: theory and evidence pp. 31-62: John Duffy and Ed Hopkins
Consistency implies equal treatment in TU-games pp. 63-82: Toru Hokari
Stationary equilibria in discounted stochastic games with weakly interacting players pp. 83-108: Ulrich Horst
Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction pp. 109-127: Steffen Huck and Wieland Müller
Allocation rules for network games pp. 128-154: Matthew Jackson
Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions pp. 155-170: Axel Ockenfels and Reinhard Selten
Experimentally observed imitation and cooperation in price competition on the circle pp. 171-192: Reinhard Selten and Jose Apesteguia
A class of consistent share functions for games in coalition structure pp. 193-212: Rene van den Brink and Gerard van der Laan
Contests with multiple rounds pp. 213-227: Huseyin Yildirim
Persistent retracts and preparation pp. 228-232: Mark Voorneveld

Convergence under replication of rules to adjudicate conflicting claims pp. 129-142: Youngsub Chun and William Thomson
Two remarks on the inner core pp. 143-154: Geoffroy de Clippel and Enrico Minelli
Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining pp. 155-177: Tore Ellingsen and Magnus Johannesson
Network formation and social coordination pp. 178-207: Sanjeev Goyal and Fernando Vega-Redondo
Nearly compact and continuous normal form games: characterizations and equilibrium existence pp. 208-224: Christopher Harris, Maxwell Stinchcombe and William Zame
Strategy-proof risk sharing pp. 225-254: Biung-Ghi Ju
Incomplete preferences and rational intransitivity of choice pp. 255-277: Michael Mandler
Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence pp. 278-311: Akira Okada and Arno Riedl
A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation pp. 312-331: Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra
Nash equilibrium and generalized integration for infinite normal form games pp. 332-365: Maxwell Stinchcombe

David Schmeidler pp. 1-2: Edi Karni and Andrew Postlewaite
Aggregate behavior and microdata pp. 3-27: Werner Hildenbrand and Alois Kneip
Subjective expected utility theory with costly actions pp. 28-41: Edi Karni
Updating non-additive probabilities-- a geometric approach pp. 42-57: Ehud Lehrer
Core convergence with asymmetric information pp. 58-78: Richard McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
Strategic dropouts pp. 79-88: Ram Orzach and Yair Tauman
A family of ordinal solutions to bargaining problems with many players pp. 89-106: Dov Samet and Zvi Safra
Decision-foundations for properties of nonadditive measures: general state spaces or general outcome spaces pp. 107-125: Peter Wakker