Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 109, issue C, 2018

Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining pp. 1-20

Volker Britz

Belief updating and the demand for information pp. 21-39

Sandro Ambuehl and Shengwu Li

An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner pp. 40-64

Brit Grosskopf, Lucas Rentschler and Rajiv Sarin

Volunteering under population uncertainty pp. 65-81

Adrian Hillenbrand and Fabian Winter

A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: Axiomatic and strategic perspectives pp. 82-98

Cheng-Cheng Hu, Min-Hung Tsay and Chun-Hsien Yeh

A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly pp. 99-103

Rabah Amir and Igor V. Evstigneev

Equilibrium informativeness in veto games pp. 104-125

Dmitry Lubensky and Eric Schmidbauer

Blackwell's informativeness theorem using diagrams pp. 126-131

Henrique de Oliveira

Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games pp. 132-155

Andreas Blume

Cognitive ability and games of school choice pp. 156-183

Christian Basteck and Marco Mantovani

Noncooperative oligopoly in economies with infinitely many commodities and traders pp. 184-200

Sayantan Ghosal and Simone Tonin

The lattice of envy-free matchings pp. 201-211

Qingyun Wu and Alvin Roth

The Skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: Theory and experiment pp. 212-239

Toshiji Kawagoe, Taisuke Matsubae and Hirokazu Takizawa

Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers pp. 240-261

Debasis Mishra, Swaprava Nath and Souvik Roy

Information diffusion in networks with the Bayesian Peer Influence heuristic pp. 262-270

Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin

Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics pp. 271-293

Dean P. Foster and Sergiu Hart

Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination pp. 294-310

Subhasish Dugar and Quazi Shahriar

Goal setting in the principal–agent model: Weak incentives for strong performance pp. 311-326

Brice Corgnet, Joaquin Gomez-Minambres and Roberto Hernán-González

Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule pp. 327-363

Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs pp. 364-381

Drew Fudenberg and Yuichiro Kamada

Bounded memory and incomplete information pp. 382-400

Benjamin Sperisen

Sampled fictitious play is Hannan consistent pp. 401-412

Zifan Li and Ambuj Tewari

On random social choice functions with the tops-only property pp. 413-435

Shurojit Chatterji and Huaxia Zeng

Perceived motives and reciprocity pp. 436-451

Yesim Orhun

Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted pp. 452-464

Vernon Smith and Bart Wilson

Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information pp. 465-483

Jon Eguia, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Rebecca Morton and Antonio Nicolo'

A theory of bargaining deadlock pp. 501-522

Ilwoo Hwang

Indexing gamble desirability by extending proportional stochastic dominance pp. 523-543

Ziv Hellman and Amnon Schreiber

Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory pp. 544-564

Eva Hoppe and Patrick Schmitz

Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks pp. 565-581

Shachar Kariv, Maciej Kotowski and Christian Leister

Contracting under uncertainty: A principal–agent model with ambiguity averse parties pp. 582-597

Simon Grant, J. Jude Kline and John Quiggin

Speculation under unawareness pp. 598-615

Spyros Galanis

Learning the fundamentals in a stationary environment pp. 616-624

Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Eran Shmaya

Financially-constrained lawyers: An economic theory of legal disputes pp. 625-647

Claudia Landeo and Maxim Nikitin

Volume 108, issue C, 2018

Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions pp. 22-36

Ziv Hellman and Ron Peretz

Decomposition of solutions and the Shapley value pp. 37-48

André Casajus and Frank Huettner

Values for environments with externalities – The average approach pp. 49-64

Ines Macho-Stadler, David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein

The Stochastic Shapley Value for coalitional games with externalities pp. 65-80

Oskar Skibski, Tomasz P. Michalak and Michael Wooldridge

Balanced externalities and the Shapley value pp. 81-92

Ben McQuillin and Robert Sugden

The proportional Shapley value and applications pp. 93-112

Sylvain Béal, Sylvain Ferrières, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

The balanced contributions property for equal contributors pp. 113-124

Koji Yokote, Takumi Kongo and Yukihiko Funaki

Membership separability: A new axiomatization of the Shapley value pp. 125-129

Geoffroy de Clippel

Is Shapley cost sharing optimal? pp. 130-138

Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden and Mukund Sundararajan

Games of threats pp. 139-145

Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman

The Shapley value of conjunctive-restricted games pp. 146-151

Jean Derks

Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule pp. 152-161

Sascha Kurz, Nicola Maaser and Stefan Napel

A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game pp. 162-169

Dongshuang Hou, Hao Sun, Panfei Sun and Theo Driessen

Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges pp. 170-181

Luke Lindsay

Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure pp. 182-205

René van den Brink, Simin He and Jia-Ping Huang

Valuing inputs under supply uncertainty: The Bayesian Shapley value pp. 206-224

Roland Pongou and Jean-Baptiste Tondji

From the bankruptcy problem and its Concede-and-Divide solution to the assignment problem and its Fair Division solution pp. 225-238

Christian Trudeau

The stochastic stability of decentralized matching on a graph pp. 239-244

Leonardo Boncinelli and Paolo Pin

The stable fixtures problem with payments pp. 245-268

Péter Biró, Walter Kern, Daniël Paulusma and Péter Wojuteczky

Competitive equilibria in school assignment pp. 269-274

Umut Dur and Thayer Morrill

Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets pp. 275-286

Ravi Jagadeesan

Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility pp. 287-294

Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo

Limited choice in college admissions: An experimental study pp. 295-316

Wei-Cheng Chen, Yi-Yi Chen and Yi-Cheng Kao

Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: Evidence from the residency match pp. 317-330

Alex Rees-Jones

A universal construction generating potential games pp. 331-340

Nikolai Kukushkin

Nonatomic potential games: the continuous strategy case pp. 341-362

Man-Wah Cheung and Ratul Lahkar

Effectivity and power pp. 363-378

Dominik Karos and Hans Peters

The conditional Shapley–Shubik measure for ternary voting games pp. 379-390

Jane Friedman and Cameron Parker

The axiom of equivalence to individual power and the Banzhaf index pp. 391-400

Ori Haimanko

The query complexity of correlated equilibria pp. 401-410

Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan

Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games pp. 411-431

János Flesch, Rida Laraki and Vianney Perchet

Money as minimal complexity pp. 432-451

Pradeep Dubey, Siddhartha Sahi and Martin Shubik

Graphical exchange mechanisms pp. 452-465

Pradeep Dubey, Siddhartha Sahi and Martin Shubik

Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games pp. 466-477

Zhigang Cao, Chengzhong Qin and Xiaoguang Yang

Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected set of commodities pp. 478-485

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal, Ludovic Julien and Simone Tonin

Tauberian theorems for general iterations of operators: Applications to zero-sum stochastic games pp. 486-503

Bruno Ziliotto

Zero-sum revision games pp. 504-522

Fabien Gensbittel, Stefano Lovo, Jérôme Renault and Tristan Tomala

Acceptable strategy profiles in stochastic games pp. 523-540

Eilon Solan

On a class of vertices of the core pp. 541-557

Michel Grabisch and Peter Sudhölter

Competitive pricing and the core: With reference to matching pp. 558-573

Joseph M. Ostroy

Fair stable sets of simple games pp. 574-584

Eduard Talamàs

Coalition preferences with individual prospects pp. 585-591

Manel Baucells and Dov Samet

Three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley pp. 592-599

Jingang Zhao

Lloyd Shapley and chess with imperfect information pp. 600-613

Alexander Matros