Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (Hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
Jose Alcalde ()
Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 110, issue C, 32-49
Sequential mechanisms to solve matching problems are useful to promote (hidden) cooperation between agents. Taking as a starting point the MIRC mechanism, employed in Spain to match medical students and residency programs in privately owned hospitals, we find that:(1)In the current system, where the number of students that each program might enroll is limited, the unique equilibrium allocation can be unstable.(2)When the above limit is not (formally) imposed, instability is not expected to occur. Nevertheless, the multiplicity of equilibria shows that coordination failure might emerge, generating a social welfare loss.(3)When the role of students and hospitals is reversed in the MIRC mechanism, (hidden) cooperation is guaranteed. Moreover, coordination failure disappears.
Keywords: MIR with consent; Hidden cooperation; Coordination; Matching mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Beyond the Spanish MIR with Consent: (Hidden) Cooperation and Coordination in Matching (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:110:y:2018:i:c:p:32-49
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