Beyond the Spanish MIR with Consent: (Hidden) Cooperation and Coordination in Matching

Jose Alcalde

No 17-1, QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory

Abstract: Sequential mechanisms to solve matching problems are useful to promote (hidden) cooperation between agents. Taking as a starting point the MIR mechanism, employed in Spain to match medical students and residency programs (in privately owned hospitals), we find that: (1) In the current system, where the number of students that each program might enroll is limited, the single equilibrium allocation can be unstable. (2) When the above limit is not (formally) imposed,instability is not expected to occur. Nevertheless, the multiplicity of equilibria shows that coordination failure might emerge, generating a social welfare loss. (3) When the role of students and hospitals is reversed in the MIR mechanism, (hidden) cooperation is guaranteed. Moreover, coordination failure disappears.

Keywords: MIR Mechanism; Hidden Cooperation; Coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2017-02-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (Hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:qmetal:2017_001

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