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Strategy-proof location of public facilities

Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge and Marc Vorsatz ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 112, issue C, 21-48

Abstract: Consider the problem of locating a public facility taking into account the agents' preferences. To construct strategy-proof social choice rules, we propose a new preference domain that allows agents to have any single-peaked or any single-dipped preference on the location of the facility such that the peak/dip of the preference is in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and study the conditions under which this family of strategy-proof rules includes non-dictatorial rules that have more than two alternatives in the range or that are Pareto efficient. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases all strategy-proof and Pareto efficient rules.

Keywords: Social choice rule; Strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency; Single-peaked preferences; Single-dipped preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: Strategy-proof location of public facilities (2015) Downloads
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