Strategy-proof location of public facilities

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu () and Marc Vorsatz

Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra from Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra

Abstract: Agents frequently have di fferent opinions on where to locate a public facility. While some agents consider the facility a good and prefer to have it nearby, others dislike it and would like to see it built far away from their own locations. To aggregate agents' preferences in these situations, we propose a new preference domain according to which each agent is allowed to have single-peaked or single-dipped preferences on the location of the facility, but in such a way that the peak or dip is situated in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and show that they are also group strategy-proof. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases the rules that additionally satisfy Pareto efficiency.

Keywords: Single-peaked preferences; single-dipped preferences; social choice rule; strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Strategy-proof location of public facilities (2018)
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