Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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Volume 102, issue C, 2017

Value Formation: The Role of Esteem pp. 1-19

Robert Akerlof

An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions pp. 20-43

Yeon-Koo Che, Syngjoo Choi and Jinwoo Kim

The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings pp. 44-55

Zhenhua Jiao and Guoqiang Tian

Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts pp. 56-68

Sangram Vilasrao Kadam

Loss allocation in energy transmission networks pp. 69-97

Gustavo Bergantiños, Julio González-Díaz, Ángel M. González-Rueda and María P. Fernández de Córdoba

Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture pp. 98-110

Jens Hougaard, Juan Moreno-Ternero, Mich Tvede and Lars Peter Østerdal

Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria pp. 111-126

John Duggan

Jumping the queue: An experiment on procedural preferences pp. 127-137

Malte Dold and Menusch Khadjavi

Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules pp. 138-146

Mert Kimya

Meet the lemons: An experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets pp. 147-161

Simon Siegenthaler

Monopoly pricing and diffusion of social network goods pp. 162-178

Euncheol Shin

Unanimous rules in the laboratory pp. 179-198

Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer and Frederic Malherbe

Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse pp. 199-223

Joseph McMurray

Propaganda and credulity pp. 224-232

Andrew T. Little

A note on testing guilt aversion pp. 233-239

Charles Bellemare, Alexander Sebald and Sigrid Suetens

Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts pp. 240-254

Eric Schmidbauer

The emergence of compositional grammars in artificial codes pp. 255-268

Fuhai Hong, Wooyoung Lim and Xiaojian Zhao

Honesty and informal agreements pp. 269-285

Martin Dufwenberg, Maroš Servátka and Radovan Vadovič

An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games pp. 286-302

Volodymyr Lugovskyy, Daniela Puzzello, Andrea Sorensen, James Walker and Arlington Williams

An experimental examination of the volunteer's dilemma pp. 303-315

Jacob Goeree, Charles Holt and Angela M. Smith

Voting with endogenous information acquisition: Experimental evidence pp. 316-338

Sourav Bhattacharya, John Duffy and SunTak Kim

Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions pp. 339-372

Michael Wellman, Eric Sodomka and Amy Greenwald

Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach pp. 373-387

Rene Kirkegaard

Committee design with endogenous participation pp. 388-408

Volker Hahn

Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games pp. 409-432

Ronald Stauber

Incentives and cheating pp. 433-444

Agne Kajackaite and Uri Gneezy

A must lie situation – avoiding giving negative feedback pp. 445-454

Uri Gneezy, Christina Gravert, Silvia Saccardo and Franziska Tausch

Inferring beliefs from actions pp. 455-461

Itai Arieli and Manuel Mueller-Frank

Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem pp. 462-476

Youngsub Chun and Duygu Yengin

A note on pre-play communication pp. 477-486

Joel Sobel

At-will relationships: How an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency pp. 487-507

Alistair Wilson and Hong Wu

Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange pp. 508-524

Antonio Nicolo' and Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez

Taking turns pp. 525-547

Greg Leo

The strategically ignorant principal pp. 548-561

Nicholas C. Bedard

Strategic manipulation in tournament games pp. 562-567

Allen I.K. Vong

Information revelation through bunching pp. 568-582

Tao Wang

Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions pp. 583-623

David R.M. Thompson and Kevin Leyton-Brown

Equilibrium trust pp. 624-644

Luca Anderlini and Daniele Terlizzese

Interim third-party selection in bargaining pp. 645-665

Jin Yeub Kim

Zero-sum games with charges pp. 666-686

János Flesch, Dries Vermeulen and Anna Zseleva

Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence pp. 687-699

Wolfgang Luhan, Anders U. Poulsen and Michael W.M. Roos

Volume 101, issue C, 2017

A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods pp. 6-19

Matthew Van Essen and Mark Walker

Implementation under ambiguity pp. 20-33

Luciano I. de Castro, Zhiwei Liu and Nicholas C. Yannelis

A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems pp. 34-48

Richard McLean and Andrew Postlewaite

Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design pp. 49-62

Ian Krajbich, Colin Camerer and Antonio Rangel

Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching pp. 63-77

Federico Echenique and Alfred Galichon

Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching pp. 78-97

John William Hatfield and Scott Kominers

Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission pp. 98-120

Jaimie W. Lien, Jie Zheng and Xiaohan Zhong

Sincere voting in large elections pp. 121-131

Avidit Acharya and Adam Meirowitz

Multicandidate elections: Aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory pp. 132-150

Laurent Bouton, Micael Castanheira and Aniol Llorente-Saguer

One man, one bid pp. 151-171

Jacob Goeree and Jingjing Zhang

Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules pp. 172-188

Craig Brett and John Weymark

Balancing the power to appoint officers pp. 189-203

Salvador Barberà and Danilo Coelho

Generalized Groves–Ledyard mechanisms pp. 204-217

Paul J. Healy and Ritesh Jain

Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses pp. 218-233

Timothy Cason and Robertas Zubrickas

How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games pp. 234-259

Thomas Palfrey, Howard Rosenthal and Nilanjan Roy

Reciprocity networks and the participation problem pp. 260-272

Martin Dufwenberg and Amrish Patel

Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability pp. 273-290

Anita Kopányi-Peuker, Theo Offerman and Randolph Sloof

Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogeneous endowments and voluntary public-good provision pp. 291-310

Claudia Keser, Andreas Markstädter and Martin Schmidt

Does team competition increase pro-social lending? Evidence from online microfinance pp. 311-333

Roy Chen, Yan Chen, Yang Liu and Qiaozhu Mei

Accounting for noise in the microfoundations of information aggregation pp. 334-353

Sera Linardi

An experimental analysis of information acquisition in prediction markets pp. 354-378

Lionel Page and Christoph Siemroth