Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability

Bettina Klaus () and Flip Klijn

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 104, issue C, 222-229

Abstract: We study many-to-many matching markets in which agents from a set A are matched to agents from a disjoint set B through a two-stage non-revelation mechanism. In the first stage, A-agents, who are endowed with a quota that describes the maximal number of agents they can be matched to, simultaneously make proposals to the B-agents. In the second stage, B-agents sequentially, and respecting the quota, choose and match to available A-proposers.

Keywords: Implementation; Matching; Mechanisms; Stability; Substitutability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability (2017)
Working Paper: Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability (2016)
Working Paper: Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:222-229

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.001

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