Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 104, issue C, 744-759

Abstract: We propose an incomplete information version of rationalizability. An action is said to be belief-free rationalizable if it survives the following iterated deletion process. At each stage, we delete actions for a type of a player that are not a best response to some conjectures of the player. The conjecture has to put positive weight only on states, and types and actions of the other players which that type thinks possible, and actions of those types that have survived so far. We analyze some economic applications under this solution concept.

Keywords: Incomplete information; Informational robustness; Bayes correlated equilibrium; Interim correlated rationalizability; Belief-free rationalizability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C79 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness (2017)
Working Paper: Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness (2016)
Working Paper: Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:744-759

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.014

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