Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

No 2066, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We propose an incomplete information analogue of rationalizability. An action is said to be belief-free rationalizable if it survives the following iterated deletion process. At each stage, we delete actions for a type of a player that are not a best response to some conjecture that puts weight only on profiles of types of other players and states that that type thinks possible, combined with actions of those types that have survived so far. We describe a number of applications. This solution concept characterizes the implications of equilibrium when a player is known to have some private information but may have additional information. It thus answers the "informational robustness" question of what can we say about the set of outcomes that may arise in equilibrium of a Bayesian game if players may observe some additional information.

Keywords: Incomplete Information; Informational Robustness; Bayes Correlated Equilibrium; Interim Correlated Rationalizability; Belief-Free Rationalizability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C79 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, (July 2017), 104: 744�759

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d20/d2066.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Journal Article: Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness (2017)
Working Paper: Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness (2017)
Working Paper: Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2066

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().