Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
Matthew Gentzkow and
Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 104, issue C, 411-429
A number of senders with no ex ante private information publicly choose signals whose realizations they observe privately. Senders then convey verifiable messages about their signal realizations to a receiver who takes a non-contractible action that affects the welfare of all players. The space of available signals includes all conditional distributions of signal realizations and allows any sender to choose a signal that is arbitrarily correlated with signals of others. We characterize the information revealed in pure-strategy equilibria and show that greater competition tends to increase the amount of information revealed.
Keywords: Communication; Collusion; Information revelation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:411-429
Access Statistics for this article
Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai
More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Dana Niculescu ().