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Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces

Matthew Gentzkow and Emir Kamenica

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 104, issue C, 411-429

Abstract: A number of senders with no ex ante private information publicly choose signals whose realizations they observe privately. Senders then convey verifiable messages about their signal realizations to a receiver who takes a non-contractible action that affects the welfare of all players. The space of available signals includes all conditional distributions of signal realizations and allows any sender to choose a signal that is arbitrarily correlated with signals of others. We characterize the information revealed in pure-strategy equilibria and show that greater competition tends to increase the amount of information revealed.

Keywords: Communication; Collusion; Information revelation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:411-429