Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Volume 100, issue C, 2016

Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games pp. 1-23

Joyee Deb, Julio González-Díaz and Jérôme Renault

The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence pp. 24-45

Seda Ertac, Levent Kockesen and Duygu Ozdemir

The power of money: Wealth effects in contests pp. 46-68

Fred Schroyen and Nicolas Treich

Learning the Krepsian state: Exploration through consumption pp. 69-94

Evan Piermont, Norio Takeoka and Roee Teper

Optimal allocation of an indivisible good pp. 95-112

Ran Shao and Lin Zhou

Social surplus determines cooperation rates in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma pp. 113-124

Gary Charness, Luca Rigotti and Aldo Rustichini

Efficient coalitional bargaining with noncontingent offers pp. 125-141

Rakesh Chaturvedi

Generalized coarse matching pp. 142-148

Ran Shao

Local incentive compatibility with transfers pp. 149-165

Debasis Mishra, Anup Pramanik and Souvik Roy

On the operation of multiple matching markets pp. 166-185

Hidekazu Anno and Morimitsu Kurino

Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions pp. 186-207

Maarten Janssen and Vladimir Karamychev

An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics pp. 208-219

Wooyoung Lim and Philip R. Neary

On the licensing of a technology with unknown use pp. 220-233

Bruno Badia and Biligbaatar Tumendemberel

When does restricting your opponent's freedom hurt you? pp. 234-239

Harry Di Pei

Reminder game: Indirectness in persuasion pp. 240-256

Toru Suzuki

Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility pp. 257-272

Avidit Acharya

Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms pp. 273-300

Simon Dato, Andreas Grunewald, Matthias Kräkel and Daniel Müller

Vagueness and information-sharing pp. 301-320

Marta Troya-Martinez

Fractional matching markets pp. 321-336

Vikram Manjunath

Price competition and reputation in credence goods markets: Experimental evidence pp. 337-352

Wanda Mimra, Alexander Rasch and Christian Waibel

Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: An experimental investigation pp. 353-375

Clayton Featherstone and Muriel Niederle

On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules pp. 376-389

Yaron Azrieli and Semin Kim

Political disagreement and information in elections pp. 390-412

Ricardo Alonso and Odilon Câmara

Cycles in public opinion and the dynamics of stable party systems pp. 413-430

Sandro Brusco and Jaideep Roy

Volume 99, issue C, 2016

Duplicative search pp. 1-22

Alexander Matros and Vladimir Smirnov

Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods pp. 23-35

Brian Baisa

Collective action: Experimental evidence pp. 36-55

María Victoria Anauati, Brian Feld, Sebastian Galiani and Gustavo Torrens

Welfare criteria from choice: An axiomatic analysis pp. 56-70

Sean Horan and Yves Sprumont

The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information pp. 71-81

Georg Nöldeke and Jorge Peña

Identification of payoffs in repeated games pp. 82-88

Byung Soo Lee and Colin Stewart

On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: A complete characterization pp. 89-98

Lei Qiao, Haomiao Yu and Zhixiang Zhang

“Giving” in to social pressure pp. 99-116

Alvaro J. Name-Correa and Huseyin Yildirim

Ordinal equivalence of values, Pigou–Dalton transfers and inequality in TU-games pp. 117-133

C. Chameni Nembua and C. Miamo Wendji

Price controls, non-price quality competition, and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium pp. 134-163

John William Hatfield, Charles Plott and Tomomi Tanaka

On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: The importance of credible claims pp. 164-179

Gary Bolton and Emin Karagözoğlu

A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space pp. 180-185

Alexander Frug

Complementary institutions and economic development: An experimental study pp. 186-205

Andrew Kloosterman and Andrew Schotter

Imitative dynamics for games with continuous strategy space pp. 206-223

Man-Wah Cheung

Goodwill Can Hurt: A theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions pp. 224-238

Charles Cadsby, Ninghua Du, Ruqu Wang and Jun Zhang

Auctions with resale: Reserve prices and revenues pp. 239-249

Gábor Virág

Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies pp. 250-256

Jacob Goeree and Alexey Kushnir

A generalized cognitive hierarchy model of games pp. 257-274

Juin-Kuan Chong, Teck Ho and Colin Camerer

Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining pp. 275-294

Salvatore Nunnari and Jan Zapal

Volume 98, issue C, 2016

Optimal task assignments pp. 1-18

Felipe Balmaceda

On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information pp. 19-33

Ulrich Berger and Ansgar Grüne

Electoral control and the human capital of politicians pp. 34-55

Peter Buisseret and Carlo Prato

Evolution and Kantian morality pp. 56-67

Ingela Alger and Jörgen Weibull

Monotone strategyproofness pp. 68-77

Guillaume Haeringer and Hanna Halaburda

Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games pp. 78-109

Elnaz Bajoori, János Flesch and Dries Vermeulen

Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships pp. 110-134

Raphael Boleslavsky and Tracy Lewis

Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes pp. 135-164

Ashish R. Hota, Siddharth Garg and Shreyas Sundaram

Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies pp. 165-171

Battal Dogan

Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful pp. 172-179

Giorgio Martini

Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: Theory and experiment pp. 180-196

Marco Castillo and Ahrash Dianat

What is trustworthiness and what drives it? pp. 197-218

James Cox, Rudolf Kerschbamer and Daniel Neururer

Private-information group contests: Best-shot competition pp. 219-234

Stefano Barbieri and David A. Malueg

Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: Existence with three players pp. 235-242

Jan Zapal

Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions pp. 243-263

Colin Camerer, Salvatore Nunnari and Thomas Palfrey

Procrastination in teams and contract design pp. 264-283

Philipp Weinschenk