A note on pre-play communication

Joel Sobel

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 102, issue C, 477-486

Abstract: Consider a finite two-player game with one round of communication. Restrict players to a subset of “monotonic” strategies. The paper justifies this restriction. The paper provides sufficient conditions under which the strategies of the restricted game that survive iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies favor the agent who can communicate.

Keywords: Communication; Dominance; Equilibrium selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:477-486

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.008

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