Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
Antonio Nicolo' () and
Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez ()
Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 102, issue C, 508-524
We consider a Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) model in which patients' preferences are restricted so that patients prefer kidneys from compatible younger donors to kidneys from older ones. We propose a family of rules, sequential priority rules, that only allow for pairwise exchanges and satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness. These rules allocate kidneys according to a priority algorithm that gives priority to patients with younger donors and assign kidneys from younger donors first. We extend the analysis to rules that allow multiple ways exchanges and to the case of patients who have more than one potential donor.
Keywords: Kidney exchange; Age-based preferences; Sequential priority rules; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D78 I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Age based preferences in paired kidney exchange (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:508-524
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