Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
John William Hatfield and
Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 101, issue C, 78-97
We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts that subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer–seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, substitutable preferences are sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes; moreover, in contrast to results for the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, if any agent's preferences are not substitutable, then the existence of a stable outcome can not be guaranteed.
Keywords: Many-to-many matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C62 D47 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:101:y:2017:i:c:p:78-97
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