Economics at your fingertips  

Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching

John William Hatfield and Scott Kominers

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 101, issue C, 78-97

Abstract: We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts that subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer–seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, substitutable preferences are sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes; moreover, in contrast to results for the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, if any agent's preferences are not substitutable, then the existence of a stable outcome can not be guaranteed.

Keywords: Many-to-many matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C62 D47 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.002

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haili He ().

Page updated 2020-10-26
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:101:y:2017:i:c:p:78-97