Committee design with endogenous participation

Volker Hahn

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 102, issue C, 388-408

Abstract: We analyze different committee designs in a model with the endogenous participation of experts who have private information about their own abilities. Each committee design involves a test of abilities whose accuracy influences experts' decisions to participate. We derive the following findings. First, higher wages continuously lower the quality of experts on the committee. Second, and as a consequence of this, optimal committees involve low wages. Third, an increase in transparency improves the quality of experts on the committee. Fourth, larger committees attract less able experts than smaller ones, unless the committee operates under full transparency.

Keywords: Committee decision-making; Adverse selection; Screening; Efficiency wages; Transparency; Career concerns (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Committee Design with Endogenous Participation (2016)
Working Paper: Committee Design with Endogenous Participation (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:388-408

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.009

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