Committee Design with Endogenous Participation

Volker Hahn

No 2013-12, Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz from Department of Economics, University of Konstanz

Abstract: We investigate the optimal design of a committee in a model with the endogenous participation of experts who have private information about their own abilities. We study three different dimensions of committee design: members' wages, the number of seats, and the communication system. We show that, surprisingly, higher wages lead to lower quality experts. By contrast, transparency improves the quality of experts on the committee. We provide a complete characterization of optimal committees. They are characterized by low wages and can be transparent or opaque. An increase in the significance of the decision requires a larger optimal committee, but does not call for different wages or for another communication system. Finally, we prove that the optimal committee design represents the best possible mechanism for the principal.

Keywords: Committee decision-making; information aggregation; adverse selection; efficiency wages; transparency; career concerns (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2013-06-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/wiwi/workingpaperseries/WP_12-Hahn_2013.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Committee design with endogenous participation (2017)
Working Paper: Committee Design with Endogenous Participation (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:knz:dpteco:1312

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://www.wiwi.uni-konstanz.de/en

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz from Department of Economics, University of Konstanz Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Office Ursprung ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).