Inferring beliefs from actions

Itai Arieli and Manuel Mueller-Frank

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 102, issue C, 455-461

Abstract: We address the question to which degree the private information of a decision maker is revealed through his optimal action, in an environment with compact metrizable state and action space. We show that the decision maker's optimal action reveals his posterior distribution for a generic set of continuous utility functions if and only if the set of actions contains no isolated points.

Keywords: Belief revelation; Information aggregation; Learning; Scoring rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D83 D85 G11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:455-461

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.014

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