Implementation under ambiguity
Luciano I. de Castro,
Zhiwei Liu and
Nicholas C. Yannelis
Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 101, issue C, 20-33
We introduce the idea of implementation under ambiguity. In particular, we study maximin efficient notions for an ambiguous asymmetric information economy (i.e., economies where agents' preferences are maximin à laWald, 1950). The interest on the maximin preferences lies in the fact that maximin efficient allocations are always incentive compatible (de Castro and Yannelis, 2009), a result which is false with Bayesian preferences. A noncooperative notion called maximin equilibrium is introduced which provides a noncooperative foundation for individually rational and maximin efficient notions. Specifically, we show that given any arbitrary individually rational and ex-ante maximin efficient allocation, there is a direct revelation mechanism that yields the efficient allocation as its unique maximin equilibrium outcome. Thus, an incentive compatible, individually rational and efficient outcome can be reached by means of noncooperative behavior under ambiguity.
Keywords: Maximin preferences; Maximin efficient allocations; Maximin equilibrium; Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D51 D61 D81 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:101:y:2017:i:c:p:20-33
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