Jumping the queue: An experiment on procedural preferences
Malte Dold and
Menusch Khadjavi ()
Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 102, issue C, 127-137
We present a three-player queuing game to study procedural preferences in a laboratory experiment. Together with markets, queues and waiting lists are universal procedures for allocating goods and services. We designed our queuing game to disentangle motivations of outcome-oriented egoistic preferences, outcome-oriented distributional (inequality aversion) preferences and outcome-independent procedural preferences. In a series of treatments, we introduce a market element and allow two of the three players to bargain over a queue jump, thus violating the queuing procedure. A third player is able to engage in peer punishment to sanction queue jumping. We provide evidence that a simple model of procedural preferences is able to explain the behavior of a share of the subjects in our experiment.
Keywords: Laboratory experiment; Procedural preferences; Inequality aversion; Queuing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 B41 C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:127-137
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