Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 67, issue 2, 2009

Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities pp. 335-350

Fabrizio Adriani and Luca Deidda

Categorizing others in a large game pp. 351-362

Yaron Azrieli

Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria pp. 363-375

Paulo Barelli

Cooperation through imitation pp. 376-388

James Bergin and Dan Bernhardt

Games played in a contracting environment pp. 389-398

V Bhaskar

Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game pp. 399-407

Dirk Engelmann and Urs Fischbacher

Subjective states: A more robust model pp. 408-427

Larry Epstein and Kyoungwon Seo

Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval pp. 428-444

Josep Freixas and William S. Zwicker

In search of stars: Network formation among heterogeneous agents pp. 445-466

Jacob Goeree, Arno Riedl and Aljaz Ule

Reciprocity and voting pp. 467-480

Volker Hahn

Self-reinforcing market dominance pp. 481-502

Daniel Halbheer, Ernst Fehr, Lorenz Goette and Armin Schmutzler

Reasoning about knowledge of unawareness pp. 503-525

Joseph Halpern and Leandro C. Rêgo

Farsightedly stable networks pp. 526-541

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability pp. 542-551

Florian Herold and Christoph Kuzmics

Status, affluence, and inequality: Rank-based comparisons in games of status pp. 552-568

Ed Hopkins and Tatiana Kornienko

Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions pp. 569-583

Roger Lagunoff

Contests with a stochastic number of players pp. 584-597

Wooyoung Lim and Alexander Matros

A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game pp. 598-610

Marina Núñez and Carles Rafels

Sequential, nonzero-sum "Blotto": Allocating defensive resources prior to attack pp. 611-615

Robert Powell

Stated beliefs versus inferred beliefs: A methodological inquiry and experimental test pp. 616-632

Elisabet Rutstrom and Nathaniel Wilcox

On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability pp. 633-644

Evan Shellshear and Peter Sudhölter

Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences pp. 645-664

Nicholas Shunda

Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism pp. 665-681

Anton Suvorov and Jeroen van de Ven

Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring pp. 682-694

Tristan Tomala

Cost sharing with multiple technologies pp. 695-707

Christian Trudeau

The target projection dynamic pp. 708-719

Elias Tsakas and Mark Voorneveld

Fully sincere voting pp. 720-735

Alexander Wolitzky

Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding pp. 736-744

Alexander Guembel and Silvia Rossetto

Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts pp. 745-749

John William Hatfield and Fuhito Kojima

Weighted congestion games with separable preferences pp. 750-757

Igal Milchtaich

Volume 67, issue 1, 2009

Special Section of Games and Economic Behavior dedicated to the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce pp. 1-1

David C. Parkes and Moshe Tennenholtz

Mediators in position auctions pp. 2-21

Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz

Congestion games with malicious players pp. 22-35

Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg and Christos H. Papadimitriou

Trading networks with price-setting agents pp. 36-50

Lawrence Blume, David Easley, Jon Kleinberg and Éva Tardos

Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games pp. 51-68

Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman and Yishay Mansour

Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions pp. 69-98

Mingyu Guo and Vincent Conitzer

Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity pp. 99-124

Ron Lavi and Chaitanya Swamy

Beyond Moulin mechanisms pp. 125-155

Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden and Mukund Sundararajan

Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources pp. 156-173

Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov and Moshe Tennenholtz

Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism pp. 174-190

Yogeshwer Sharma and David P. Williamson

Elections with platform and valence competition pp. 191-216

Scott Ashworth and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita

Membership in citizen groups pp. 217-232

Stefano Barbieri and Andrea Mattozzi

Gift giving and worker productivity: Evidence from a firm-level experiment pp. 233-244

Charles Bellemare and Bruce Shearer

Competitive environments and protective behavior pp. 245-252

Peter Borm, Arantza Estévez-Fernández and M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro

Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: A case study of public goods pp. 253-265.e3

Anabela Botelho, Glenn Harrison, Ligia Pinto and Elisabet Rutstrom

Stable allocations of risk pp. 266-276

Péter Csóka, P. Jean-Jacques Herings and László Kóczy

The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments pp. 277-291

Yuk-fai Fong and Jay Surti

Private provision of discrete public goods pp. 292-299

Miltiadis Makris

Indifference and incompleteness distinguished by rational trade pp. 300-314

Michael Mandler

Efficiency and competition in the long run: The survival of the unfit pp. 315-330

Gábor Virág

On the superiority of fixed fee over auction in asymmetric markets pp. 331-333

Giorgos Stamatopoulos and Tami Tauman