Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol

Yuval Heller

Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 69, issue 2, 394-400

Abstract: This paper analyzes the implementation of correlated equilibria that are immune to joint deviations of coalitions by cheap-talk protocols. We construct a cheap-talk protocol that is resistant to deviations of fewer than half the players, and using it, we show that a large set of correlated equilibria can be implemented as Nash equilibria in the extended game with cheap-talk. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in general there is no cheap-talk protocol that is resistant for deviations of half the players.

Keywords: Non-cooperative; games; Cheap-talk; Correlated; equilibrium; Strong; equilibrium; Coalition-proof; equilibrium; Fault-tolerant; distributed; computation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: A minority-proof cheap-talk protocol (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:394-400

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