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Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives

Robert Dur and Joeri Sol

Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 69, issue 2, 293-301

Abstract: Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also in social interaction with their colleagues, which in turn creates co-worker altruism. We study how financial incentives for productive activities can improve or damage the work climate. We show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate.

Keywords: Social; interaction; Altruism; Incentive; contracts; Co-worker; satisfaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (93)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives (2008) Downloads
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