Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives

Robert Dur and Joeri Sol ()
Additional contact information
Joeri Sol: University of Amsterdam

No 4532, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also in social interaction with their colleagues, which in turn creates co-worker altruism. We study how financial incentives for productive activities can improve or damage the work climate. We show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate.

Keywords: incentive contracts; altruism; social interaction; co-worker satisfaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 J41 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2009-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-lab and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published - published in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, 69 (2), 293-301

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Related works:
Journal Article: Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives (2010)
Working Paper: Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives (2009)
Working Paper: Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives (2008)
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