On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenael Piaser () and Uday Rajan

Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 68, issue 1, 376-380

Abstract: We provide two examples in a pure moral hazard setting with two principals and two agents. Example 1 shows that a strongly robust equilibrium in simple (direct) mechanisms can no longer be sustained as an equilibrium when a principal can deviate to an indirect communication scheme. Conversely, an equilibrium with one principal offering an indirect mechanism cannot be replicated as an equilibrium in simple mechanisms. Example 2 shows more directly that a payoff profile that can be achieved in equilibrium when one principal offers an indirect mechanism cannot be achieved as an equilibrium profile in simple mechanisms.

Keywords: Moral; hazard; Multiple; principals; Multiple; agents; Simple; mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:68:y:2010:i:1:p:376-380

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