Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 65, issue 2, 2009

Strong price of anarchy pp. 289-317

Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman and Yishay Mansour

Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities pp. 318-338

Jonas Björnerstedt and Andreas Westermark

Aggregation of expert opinions pp. 339-371

Dino Gerardi, Richard McLean and Andrew Postlewaite

Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids pp. 372-405

Angel Hernando-Veciana

Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case pp. 406-429

Josef Hofbauer, Jörg Oechssler and Frank Riedel

Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions pp. 430-460

Nathan Larson

Imitation and luck: An experimental study on social sampling pp. 461-502

Theo Offerman and Andrew Schotter

Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models pp. 503-515

Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters

Moderation of an ideological party pp. 516-537

Vlasta Pokladniková and Muhamet Yildiz

Choice of routes in congested traffic networks: Experimental tests of the Braess Paradox pp. 538-571

Amnon Rapoport, Tamar Kugler, Subhasish Dugar and Eyran J. Gisches

Equilibrium play and best response to (stated) beliefs in normal form games pp. 572-585

Pedro Rey-Biel

Contracts with endogenous information pp. 586-625

Dezsoe Szalay

Learning by trial and error pp. 626-643

H. Young

A note on equivalence of consistency and bilateral consistency through converse consistency pp. 644-648

Theo Driessen and Cheng-Cheng Hu

Proposals to host the Fourth World Congress of the Game Theory Society pp. 649-649

Sergiu Hart

Volume 65, issue 1, 2009

Introduction to the Special Issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Martin Shubik pp. 1-6

Rabah Amir, Robert Aumann, James Peck and Myrna Wooders

Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games pp. 7-24

Rabah Amir and Francis Bloch

Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values pp. 25-48

Aloisio Araujo and Luciano de Castro

Outside options, component efficiency, and stability pp. 49-61

André Casajus

Price-quantity competition with varying toughness pp. 62-82

Claude d'Aspremont and Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira

The strategy structure of some coalition formation games pp. 83-104

Gabrielle Demange

Games of status and discriminatory contracts pp. 105-123

Amrita Dhillon and Alexander Herzog-Stein

Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly) pp. 124-141

Pradeep Dubey and Dieter Sondermann

Cournot equilibrium without apology: Existence and the Cournot inverse demand function pp. 142-175

Isabel Grilo and Jean-François Mertens

If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design pp. 176-204

Brit Grosskopf and Alvin Roth

Production-inventory games: A new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games pp. 205-219

Luis A. Guardiola, Ana Meca and Justo Puerto

Walrasian analysis via two-player games pp. 220-233

Carlos Hervés-Beloso and Emma Moreno-García

Convergence of strategic behavior to price taking pp. 234-241

Leonidas C. Koutsougeras

Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index pp. 242-255

Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano

First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution pp. 256-269

Paulo Monteiro

Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes pp. 270-286

Mario Pascoa and Abdelkrim Seghir

Proposals to host the Fourth World Congress of the Game Theory Society pp. 287-287

Sergiu Hart

A special issue of the IJGT in honor of Michael Maschler pp. 288-288

Shmuel Zamir and Salvador Barberà

Volume 64, issue 2, 2008

In memoriam: Michael B. Maschler (1927-2008) pp. 351-351

Ehud Kalai

In memory of my father pp. 352-354

Yael Maschler

Working with Mike pp. 355-360

Robert Aumann

Michael Maschler in Barcelona pp. 361-362

Salvador Barberà

The mentor pp. 363-363

Louis J. Billera

My referee and collaborator pp. 364-364

Daniel Granot

A mathematics teacher pp. 365-366

Ein-Ya Gura

Michael's questions pp. 367-367

Sergiu Hart

An advocate of cooperative theory pp. 368-368

Herve Moulin

Helping young game theorists pp. 369-369

Guillermo Owen

My joint work with Michael Maschler pp. 370-371

Bezalel Peleg

Michael Maschler in The Netherlands pp. 372-372

Jos Potters and S. Tijs

Michael Maschler at the Center for the Study of Rationality pp. 373-373

Hana Shemesh

In memory of Michael Maschler pp. 374-374

Martin Shubik

Learning from Michael Maschler and working with him pp. 375-375

Eilon Solan

Michael Maschler, a special friend pp. 376-377

Marilda Sotomayor

Michael Maschler: My lost migration compass pp. 378-379

Oded Stark

Michael Maschler in Bilbao pp. 380-380

Federico Valenciano

In memory of Michael Maschler pp. 381-381

Myrna Wooders

Michael Maschler, game theory, and the Talmud pp. 382-382

H. Young

Teacher, colleague and coauthor pp. 383-384

Shmuel Zamir

Biographical information: Michael B. Maschler pp. 385-387

Shmuel Zamir

Majority rule when voters like to win pp. 393-420

Steven Callander

Of mice and men: Within gender variation in strategic behavior pp. 421-432

Marco Castillo and Philip J. Cross

Informed principal with correlation pp. 433-456

Michela Cella

A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games pp. 457-469

José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz and Nicolás E. Stier-Moses

The [alpha]-beauty contest: Choosing numbers, thinking intervals pp. 470-486

Enrico De Giorgi and Stefan Reimann

Mechanism design with partial state verifiability pp. 487-513

Raymond Deneckere and Sergei Severinov

The strategic Marshallian cross pp. 514-532

Alex Dickson and Roger Hartley

Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences pp. 533-547

Lars Ehlers and Ton Storcken

Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow pp. 548-564

Kjell Hausken

The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games pp. 565-590

Ratul Lahkar and William Sandholm

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences pp. 591-611

Jordi Masso and Antonio Nicolo'

Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions pp. 612-631

Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan

Incentives in decentralized random matching markets pp. 632-649

Joana Pais

Stochastic stability and time-dependent mutations pp. 650-665

Maxwell Pak

The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic pp. 666-683

William Sandholm, Emin Dokumaci and Ratul Lahkar

Volume 64, issue 1, 2008

Large games and the law of large numbers pp. 1-34

Nabil I. Al-Najjar

Sharing a river among satiable agents pp. 35-50

Stefan Ambec and Lars Ehlers

Nash implementation without no-veto power pp. 51-67

Jean-Pierre Benoît and Efe Ok

Advertising, brand loyalty and pricing pp. 68-80

Ioana Chioveanu

Experiments with network formation pp. 81-120

P. Dean Corbae and John Duffy

Conspicuous consumption dynamics pp. 121-145

Daniel Friedman and Daniel N. Ostrov

Obligations and cooperative behaviour in public good games pp. 146-170

Roberto Galbiati and Pietro Vertova

Revenue equivalence revisited pp. 171-192

Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel and Tim Salmon

Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries pp. 193-218

Hideo Konishi and Margarita Sapozhnikov

Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison pp. 219-236

Dorothea Kübler, Wieland Müller and Hans-Theo Normann

Aversion to norm-breaking: A model pp. 237-267

Raúl López-Pérez

Strategic divide and choose pp. 268-289

Antonio Nicolo' and Yan Yu

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game pp. 290-302

Marina Núñez and Carles Rafels

School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms pp. 303-328

Joana Pais and Ágnes Pintér

On the use of menus in sequential common agency pp. 329-334

Giacomo Calzolari and Alessandro Pavan

Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories pp. 335-350

Bertrand Tchantcho, Lawrence Diffo Lambo, Roland Pongou and Bertrand Mbama Engoulou