Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability

Matteo Triossi

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 66, issue 1, 566-575

Abstract: This note considers a hiring mechanism with multiple applications and application costs, which encompasses the common features of many real-world procedures. Multiple applications impose serious coordination problems to colleges, but application costs restore stability. With zero application costs unstable allocations arise at equilibrium. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee the stability of the outcomes.

Date: 2009
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