Informational externalities and emergence of consensus

Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan () and Nicolas Vieille ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 66, issue 2, 979-994

Abstract: We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and provide the exact rate at which experimentation decays. We also provide tight conditions under which players eventually reach a consensus. These results imply extensions of many known results in the literature of social learning and getting to agreement.

Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:2:p:979-994

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