Informational externalities and emergence of consensus

Nicolas Vieille (), Eilon Solan () and Dinah Rosenberg

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Abstract: We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and provide the exact rate at which experimentation decays. We also provide tight conditions under which players eventually reach a consensus. These results imply extensions of many known results in the literature of social learning and getting to agreement.

Keywords: Consensus; Informational externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-07-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, Vol.66,n°2, pp.979-994. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.027⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00464565

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.027

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