Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 87, issue C, 2014

Dynamic beliefs pp. 1-18

Rosario Macera

Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements pp. 19-33

Luis Vasconcelos

Ethics, welfare, and capital markets pp. 34-49

George Kanatas and Christodoulos Stefanadis

Staying ahead and getting even: Risk attitudes of experienced poker players pp. 50-69

David Eil and Jaimie W. Lien

Variable temptations and black mark reputations pp. 70-90

Christina Aperjis, Richard Zeckhauser and Yali Miao

A foundation for strategic agenda voting pp. 91-99

Jose Apesteguia, Miguel Ballester and Yusufcan Masatlioglu

Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: An experimental study pp. 100-121

Luis Cabral, Erkut Ozbay and Andrew Schotter

Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis pp. 122-135

Mariana Blanco, Dirk Engelmann, Alexander Koch and Hans-Theo Normann

Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring pp. 136-160

Marie Laclau

Price formation in a matching market with targeted offers pp. 161-177

József Sákovics

A generalized approach to belief learning in repeated games pp. 178-203

Christos Ioannou and Julian Romero

Learning with bounded memory in games pp. 204-223

Daniel Monte

Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules pp. 224-238

Subhasish Chowdhury, Roman Sheremeta and Theodore Turocy

Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices pp. 239-252

Dominik Karos

Conditional belief types pp. 253-268

Alfredo Di Tillio, Joseph Halpern and Dov Samet

On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm pp. 269-287

Keisuke Bando

Probabilistic dominance and status quo bias pp. 288-304

Gil Riella and Roee Teper

On fair division of a homogeneous good pp. 305-321

Uriel Feige and Moshe Tennenholtz

Identities, selection, and contributions in a public-goods game pp. 322-338

Gary Charness, Ramon Cobo-Reyes and Natalia Jiménez

Sharing the cost of redundant items pp. 339-352

Jens Hougaard and Herve Moulin

Tough negotiations: Bilateral bargaining with durable commitments pp. 353-366

Tore Ellingsen and Topi Miettinen

An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism pp. 367-380

David Hugh-Jones, Morimitsu Kurino and Christoph Vanberg

Learning in society pp. 381-396

Braz Camargo

Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures pp. 397-411

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Simon Weidenholzer

The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations pp. 412-418

Lucas Maestri

Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages pp. 419-441

Shintaro Miura

From Custer to Thermopylae: Last stand behavior in multi-stage contests pp. 442-466

Alan Gelder

Premium auctions and risk preferences: An experimental study pp. 467-484

Christoph Brunner, Audrey Hu and Jörg Oechssler

Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters pp. 485-496

Masaki Aoyagi

Drugs, guns, and targeted competition pp. 497-507

Andrei Dubovik and Alexei Parakhonyak

A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites pp. 508-518

Tsuyoshi Adachi

Congested observational learning pp. 519-538

Erik Eyster, Andrea Galeotti, Navin Kartik and Matthew Rabin

Assigning agents to a line pp. 539-553

Jens Hougaard, Juan Moreno-Ternero and Lars Peter Østerdal

Why do people rate? Theory and evidence on online ratings pp. 554-570

Jonathan Lafky

Judgment aggregation in search for the truth pp. 571-590

İrem Bozbay, Franz Dietrich and Hans Peters

Optimal truncation in matching markets pp. 591-615

Peter Coles and Ran Shorrer

Mixed equilibria in runoff elections pp. 619-623

Dimitrios Xefteris

Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets pp. 624-630

Antonio Romero-Medina and Matteo Triossi

Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement pp. 631-641

Daniel Garrett

Asking questions pp. 642-650

Nenad Kos

Volume 86, issue C, 2014

Wealth effects and agency costs pp. 1-11

Hector Chade and Virginia N. Vera de Serio

Incentives and group identity pp. 12-25

Paolo Masella, Stephan Meier and Philipp Zahn

Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies pp. 26-39

Wonki Cho

On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict pp. 40-57

Juan A. Lacomba, Francisco Lagos, Ernesto Reuben and Frans van Winden

A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring pp. 58-66

Katsuhiko Aiba

Universality of Nash components pp. 67-76

Dieter Balkenborg and Dries Vermeulen

Strategies and evolution in the minority game: A multi-round strategy experiment pp. 77-95

Jona Linde, Joep Sonnemans and Jan Tuinstra

Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems pp. 96-101

Tsuyoshi Adachi

On the beliefs off the path: Equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-k pp. 102-125

Yves Breitmoser, Jonathan Tan and Daniel Zizzo

Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies pp. 126-144

Elias Tsakas

Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts pp. 145-164

Ines Macho-Stadler, David Perez-Castrillo and Nicolás Porteiro

A competitive partnership formation process pp. 165-177

Tommy Andersson, Jens Gudmundsson, Adolphus Talman and Zaifu Yang

On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols pp. 178-183

Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski

The crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing: An experimental study pp. 184-211

Wanchuan Lin, Yiming Liu and Juanjuan Meng

Random dictatorship domains pp. 212-236

Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen and Huaxia Zeng

Impulse balance in the newsvendor game pp. 237-247

Axel Ockenfels and Reinhard Selten

Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions pp. 248-263

Mark A. Satterthwaite, Steven R. Williams and Konstantinos Zachariadis

The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: An experimental study pp. 264-281

Francesco Brindisi, Boğaçhan Çelen and Kyle Hyndman

Information transmission and inefficient lobbying pp. 282-307

Rafael Lima and Humberto Moreira

Level-k reasoning in a generalized beauty contest pp. 308-329

Dmitry Shapiro, Xianwen Shi and Arthur Zillante

The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions pp. 330-338

Christian Seel

Truthful germs are contagious: A local-to-global characterization of truthfulness pp. 340-366

Aaron Archer and Robert Kleinberg

Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis pp. 367-391

Ning Chen, Arpita Ghosh and Nicolas Lambert

Destroy to save pp. 392-404

Geoffroy de Clippel, Victor Naroditskiy, Maria Polukarov, Amy Greenwald and Nicholas R. Jennings

Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties pp. 405-420

Mathijs M. de Weerdt, Paul Harrenstein and Vincent Conitzer

Bayes–Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction pp. 421-437

Renato Gomes and Kane Sweeney

Fault tolerance in large games pp. 438-457

Ronen Gradwohl and Omer Reingold

Designing incentives for online question-and-answer forums pp. 458-474

Shaili Jain, Yiling Chen and David C. Parkes

Pricing traffic in a spanning network pp. 475-490

Herve Moulin

Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification pp. 491-509

Paolo Penna and Carmine Ventre