Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable

John Rehbeck

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 88, issue C, 207-210

Abstract: We extend the result from Bossert and Sprumont (2013) that every single-valued choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable via strict preferences to the case of choice correspondences via weak preferences.

Keywords: Revealed preference; Backwards-induction; Rationalizability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:88:y:2014:i:c:p:207-210

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.005

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