The division problem under constraints

Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 89, issue C, 56-77

Abstract: The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family of all extended uniform rules coincides with the set of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions.

Keywords: Division problem; Single-peaked preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Division Problem under Constraints (2015)
Working Paper: The Division Problem under Constraints (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:89:y:2015:i:c:p:56-77

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.002

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