The Division Problem under Constraints

Gustavo Bergantiños, Alejandro Neme () and Jordi Massó
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jordi Masso and Gustavo Bergantiños

No 745, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family of all extended uniform rules coincides with the set of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions.

Keywords: Single-peaked preferences; Division Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: The division problem under constraints (2015)
Working Paper: The Division Problem under Constraints (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:745

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