 Unpredictability of complex (pure) strategiesTai-Wei Hu Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 88, issue C, 1-15 Abstract: Unpredictable behavior is central to optimal play in many strategic situations because predictable patterns leave players vulnerable to exploitation. A theory of unpredictable behavior based on differential complexity constraints is presented in the context of repeated two-person zero-sum games. Each player's complexity constraint is represented by an endowed oracle and a strategy is feasible if it can be implemented with an oracle machine using that oracle. When one player's oracle is sufficiently more complex than the other player's, an equilibrium exists with one player fully exploiting the other. If each player has an incompressible sequence (relative to the opponent's oracle) according to Kolmogorov complexity, an equilibrium exists in which equilibrium payoffs are equal to those of the stage game and all equilibrium strategies are unpredictable. A full characterization of history-independent equilibrium strategies is also obtained. Keywords: Kolmogorov complexity; Objective probability; Frequency theory of probability; Mixed strategy; Zero-sum game; Algorithmic randomness (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:88:y:2014:i:c:p:1-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.08.002 Access Statistics for this article Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier |
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