All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes

Yizhaq Minchuk and Aner Sela

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 88, issue C, 130-134

Abstract: We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that, independent of the ranking of the uncertain prize, if the uncertain prize is not the lowest one, a player's effort as well as his expected payoff increase in his value for the uncertain prize. Otherwise, if this prize is the lowest one, we obtain that a player's effort may decrease in his value for the uncertain prize but his expected utility increases.

Keywords: Contests; All-pay auctions; Uncertain prizes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 J31 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825614001407
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:88:y:2014:i:c:p:130-134

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.006

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().