X-games

Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 89, issue C, 93-100

Abstract: What is common to the following situations: designing random incentive schemes to implement team effort, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which captures these situations as well as others, and use it to unify and extend the separate analyses that they received in the literature.

Keywords: Externalities; Strategic complements; Strategic substitutes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Related works:
Working Paper: X-Games (2014)
Working Paper: X-Games (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:89:y:2015:i:c:p:93-100

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.005

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