X-Games

Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler ()

No 275795, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: What is common to the following situations: incentivizing collective action in the presence of social preferences, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which unifies these situations as well as others, and use it to unify and extend the separate analyses that they received in the literature.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17
Date: 2013-12-23
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Related works:
Journal Article: X-games (2015)
Working Paper: X-Games (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275795

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275795

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