Committees with leaks

Saptarshi P. Ghosh and Jaideep Roy

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 90, issue C, 207-214

Abstract: We analyze the quality (informativeness and efficiency) of advice obtained from a committee of careerist experts where voting is secret but voting profiles are ‘leaked’ with an exogenously given probability. We show that fully informative voting is achievable only when the common prior is not too informative, the committee uses the unanimity rule and faces random leakage. It is then shown that informativeness and efficiency are mutually exclusive properties of committees with careerist experts.

Keywords: Leakage; Career concerns; Informative voting; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D71 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:90:y:2015:i:c:p:207-214

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.012

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