“Bucket auctions” for charity

Jeffrey Carpenter, Jessica Holmes and Peter Matthews

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 88, issue C, 260-276

Abstract: Donations in-kind can be a mixed blessing for charities, who are often more adept at solicitation than resale. Many organizations rely on raffles to turn donations into cash, but auctions are also common. Theory predicts that all-pay mechanisms should produce more revenue than winner-pay mechanisms, but the empirical literature is thin and inconclusive. Drawing on both theoretical insights and behavioral intuition, we examine another all-pay mechanism, the “bucket auction,” and show that it generates more revenue than other standard mechanisms, both in theory and in the lab. We hope, therefore, that this format, and others like it, will attract the interest of fundraisers.

Keywords: Charity auction; Fundraising; Charitable giving; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D44 D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:88:y:2014:i:c:p:260-276

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.007

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