Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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A Noncooperative Analysis of Hotelling's Location Game pp. 165-186: Helmut Bester, André de Palma, Wolfgang Leininger, Jonathan Thomas and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden
Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games pp. 187-218: Russell Cooper, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Thomas Ross
Equilibrium Selection and Consistency pp. 219-225: Henk Norde, Jos Potters, Hans Reijnierse and Dries Vermeulen
Multiperson Bargaining over Two Alternatives pp. 226-244: Clara Ponsati and József Sákovics
The Design and Performance of Sharing Rules for a Partnership in Continuous Time pp. 245-265: Aldo Rustichini and Roy Radner
A Property of the Core pp. 266-273: Abhijit Sengupta and Kunal Sengupta
The One-Shot-Deviation Principle for Sequential Rationality pp. 274-282: Ebbe Hendon, Hans Jorgen Jacobsen and Birgitte Sloth
IN MEMORIAM: N. N. Vorob'ev (1925-1995) pp. 283-285: A. A. Korbut and Elena Yanovskaya

Multiplayer Bargaining Situations: A Decision Theoretic Approach pp. 1-20: Murali Agastya
Efficient Allocation of a "Pie": Divisible Case of King Solomon's Dilemma pp. 21-41: Parimal Bag
The Owen Value Applied to Games with Graph-Restricted Communication pp. 42-53: Margarita Vazquez-Brage, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado and Francesc Carreras
On the Existence and Formation of Partnerships pp. 54-67: Francesc Carreras
Value, Consistency, and Random Coalition Formation pp. 68-80: Robert Evans
Endogenous Stackelberg Equilibria with Identical Firms pp. 81-94: Debashis Pal
A Theory of Partnership Dynamics pp. 95-112: David Roth
Axiomatizations of the Conjunctive Permission Value for Games with Permission Structures pp. 113-126: Rene van den Brink and Robert P. Gilles
Pollination and Reward: A Game-Theoretic Approach pp. 127-142: Fernando Vega-Redondo
Information Transmission When the Informed Party Is Confused pp. 143-161: Joel Watson
Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Commonp-Beliefs pp. 162-164: Zvika Neeman

Introduction pp. 103-110: Sigmund Karl and H. Young
The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision pp. 111-145: Lawrence Blume
Stability by Mutation in Evolutionary Games pp. 146-172: Immanuel Bomze and Burger Reinhard
Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability? pp. 173-192: Immanuel Bomze and Jörgen Weibull
The Finite Horizon War of Attrition pp. 193-236: Cannings C. and Whittaker J. C.
Evolutionary Game Theory with Two Groups of Individuals pp. 237-253: Cressman R.
Bayesian Learning in Repeated Normal Form Games pp. 254-278: Jürgen Eichberger
Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons, and the Replicator Equation pp. 279-303: Gaunersdorfer Andrea and Josef Hofbauer
Learning by Forgetful Players pp. 304-329: Sjaak Hurkens
Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations pp. 330-363: Kaniovski Yuri M. and H. Young
Invasion Dynamics of the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma pp. 364-390: Nowak Martin A. and Sigmund Karl
Expectations, Drift, and Volatility in Evolutionary Games pp. 391-412: Fernando Vega-Redondo

Musical Chairs: Modeling Noisy Evolution pp. 1-35: Binmore Kenneth G., Samuelson Larry and Vaughan Richard
Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games with Recommended Play pp. 36-63: Jordi Brandts and W. Bentley Macleod
Fictitious Play by Cases pp. 64-89: Marco LiCalzi

Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement pp. 255-283: Peter Cramton and Thomas Palfrey
Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play pp. 284-317: José Luis Ferreira, Itzhak Gilboa and Maschler M.
A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Incomplete Information pp. 318-332: John Harsanyi
How to Select a Dual Nash Equilibrium pp. 333-354: Philippe Jehiel and Bernard Walliser
A Transfer Property of Equilibrium Payoffs in Economies with Land pp. 355-367: Legut Jerzy, Potters Jos A. M. and Tijs Stef H.

Introduction pp. 1-5: John Ledyard and Thomas Palfrey
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games pp. 6-38: McKelvey Richard D. and Thomas Palfrey
Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents pp. 39-64: James Andreoni and Miller John H.
Outside Options and Social Comparison in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments pp. 65-94: Knez Marc J. and Camerer Colin F.
Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining pp. 95-121: Gary Bolton and Rami Zwick
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History pp. 122-142: Berg Joyce, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe
Commitment versus Discretion in the Peasant-Dictator Game pp. 143-170: John van Huyck, Raymond Battalio and Walters Mary F.
Common Pool Resource Dilemmas under Uncertainty: Qualitative Tests of Equilibrium Solutions pp. 171-201: Budescu David V., Amnon Rapoport and Suleiman Ramzi
Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria: An Experimental Study pp. 202-217: Ochs Jack
On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence pp. 218-254: Dale Stahl and Paul Wilson

Virtual Implementation in Separable Bayesian Environments Using Simple Mechanisms pp. 127-138: Anil Arya, Glover Jonathan and Young Richard
Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium Based upon Expected Utility and Quadratic Utility pp. 139-150: Cheng Leonard K. and Zhu Min
Lower Hemicontinuity of the Nash Equilibrium Correspondence pp. 151-160: Engl Greg
Stochastic Common Learning pp. 161-171: Monderer Dov and Dov Samet
Effectivity Functions and Associated Claim Game Correspondences pp. 172-190: Otten Gert-Jan, Peter Borm, Storcken Ton and Tijs Stef
Games of Fair Division pp. 191-204: Tadenuma Koichi and William Thomson
Bargained-Correlated Equilibria pp. 205-221: Piero Tedeschi
On Nash-Implementation in the Presence of Withholding pp. 222-233: Guoqiang Tian and Qi Li
Endogenous Timing in Two-Player Games: A Counterexample pp. 234-237: Rabah Amir
A Note on the Probability of k Pure Nash Equilibria in Matrix Games pp. 238-246: Stanford William
Rationality and Coordination, Cristina Bicchieri, Cambridge University Press, 1993. Part of a series called Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory. Edited by Brian Skyrms. 270 pp. plus preface, ISBN 0-521-38123-1 pp. 247-250: Cristina Bicchieri

Unlearning by Not Doing: Repeated Games with Vanishing Actions pp. 1-7: Joosten Reinoud, Hans Peters and Thuijsman Frank
Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games pp. 8-20: James Jordan
Order Independent Equilibria pp. 21-34: Benny Moldovanu and Eyal Winter
Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection pp. 35-65: Roger Myerson
Competitively Sustainable Matching Plans with Discounting pp. 66-78: Green Gordon R.
Social Norms and Random Matching Games pp. 79-109: Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Andrew Postlewaite
Remarks on Infinitely Repeated Extensive-Form Games pp. 110-115: Ariel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky
A Note on Repeated Extensive Games pp. 116-123: Sylvain Sorin